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Unused powers: contestation 
over autonomy legislation 
in the PRC 
Yash Ghai and Sophia Woodman1 
Introduction 
is a paradox at the heart of current arrangements for autonomy 
for ethnic minorities inthe PRC. The most important and distinctive 
power granted to autonomous areas in China's system of Nationalities 
Regional Autonomy (NRA, minzu quyu zizhi) allows them to modify higher- 
level laws and policies.2 But this power is hardly used, and has remained 
uncodified until recently, existing in law only in very rudimentary form. 
Efforts by the five autonomous regions (ARs) to exercise these powers have 
been repeatedly blocked, a sign of contestation over what the law on 
autonomy can and should mean. 
While autonomous areas should theoretically have the most extensive 
level of self-government of any localities in the PRC, our research shows that 
no significant autonomy legislation has actually been passed at the level of ARs3; 
autonomy legislation has mainly been enacted at prefectural or county levels 
to implement higher-level laws and policies. 
Under the current PRC legal framework, the "modification power" 
(biantongquan)4 is one of two principal methods for the exercise of autonomy. 
The other is the allocation of key government posts in autonomous areas to 
minority members. Modification should give the "organs of autonomy" in 
the area the power to alter state laws and policies to suit "the political, 
economic, and cultural characteristics" of the particular minority.5 It is thus 
essential to understanding the nature of autonomy as conceived of within 
1 The University of Hong Kong's Distinguished Researcher Award, given to Yash Ghai, supported 
the research and writing of this article. 2 Yang Xu, "Minzu zizhi difang lifa xuanti ji biantong wenti chutan LA Preliminary Discussion 
on the Choice of Subjects for Legislation in Autonomous Areas and the Problem of Modification], 
Manzu yanjin, no. 3, 2002, p. 5. 3 Autonomous areas in the PKL are estaDiisnea t tnree aaministrauve levels: autonomous 
regions (analogous to provinces), autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties. 
4 Cai Dingjian, Xianfajingjie [The Essence of the Constitution] (Beijing: Falu chubanshe, 2004) , 
pp. 391-2. ^ _ 5 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 1982,Art. 112andArt. 116. 
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the Chinese system, and critical to answering the question of whether the 
minority areas could exercise "genuine autonomy."6 
Western academic studies measuring the practice of NRA against an ideal 
type of autonomy have generally found it deficient in a number of key 
respects,7 although opinion differs on whether this is an inevitable result of 
the existing framework,8 ordue to the failure to implement laws that provide 
for significant autonomy.9 In the literature on minorities in China, the legal 
framework for autonomy has received relatively little attention,10 as it is 
generally assumed to be of negligible importance since politics and policy - 
and hence the Party - dominate in minority areas.11 
But from the beginning of the reform era in the late 1970s, law has been 
a field of debate within the PRC over what autonomy means, with a significant 
focus being the scope of the legislative powers of autbnomous areas. To date, 
however, no comprehensive account of the existing framework for these 
powers has been published in English.12 This is part of a more general lack 
of attention in the literature to ways in which administrative forms have 
shaped ethnic claims and identities in the PRC.13 As in many other parts of 
the world, legal decentralization in the PRC has been half-hearted, to say 
the least. In fact, key elements of autonomy systems, such as identifying which 
matters are within the sphere of autonomy and which are reserved for the 
6 Since his 1988 Strasbourg speech, the Dalai Lama has repeatedly stated that he is not seeking 
independence for Tibet, but would be satisfied with "genuine autonomy" within the PRC. See Baogang 
He and Barry Sautman, "The Politics of the Dalai Lama's New Initiative for Autonomy," Pacific Affairs, 
vol. 78, no. 4 (2005), pp. 601-29. 7 See for example Barry Sautman, "Legal Reform and Minority Rights in China," in Stuart S. 
Nagel, ed., Handbook of Global Legal Policy (New York: Marcel Dekker, 2000), p. 73; Matthew Moneyhon, 
"Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China's New Frontier," Asian-Pacific Imw and Policy fournal, vol. 
3, no. 4 (February 2002), pp. 10-11. 8 Yash P. Ghai, "Autonomy Regimes in China: Coping with Ethnic and Economic Diversity," in 
Ghai, ed, Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States (Cambridge, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 9 Colin P. Mackerras, Chinas Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 15S-166, pp. 264-5. 10 A few notable exceptions are Katherine P. Kaup, Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 116-120; Chien-min Chao, "The Procedure for Local 
Legislation in Mainland China and legislation in National Autonomous Areas," Issues and Studies, vol. 
30, no. 9 (September 1994), pp. 95-116; Binh G. Phan, "How Autonomous are the National 
Autonomous Areas of the PRC? An Analysis of Documents and Cases," Issues and Studies, vol. 32, no. 
7, (July 1996), pp. 83-108; Barry Sautman, "Ethnic Law and Minority Rights in China: Progress and 
Constraints," Imw and Policy, vol. 21, no. 3 (July 1999), pp. 283-314; and Theodore C. Sorensen and 
David L. Philips, l^egal Standards and Autonomy Options for Minorities in China: the Tibetan Case (Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University, 2004). 11 See Colin Mackerras, Chinas Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation (London and New York: 
Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 26; Stevan Harrell, Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China (Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 48. 12 The legal framework is briefly outlined in Shi Wenzheng and Bu Xiaolin, "Legislation in 
National Autonomous Areas in the People's Republic of China," in Jan Michiel Otto et al., eds., Law- 
Making in the Peoples Republic of China (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) . 13 Katherine Palmer Kaup, Regionalism versus Ethnic nationalism in the PRC, I he China 
Quarterly 172 (2002), pp. 863-884. 
30 
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central authorities, are absent. But in China as elsewhere, giving autonomy 
legal expression, however vague, has made the law a field for contention 
over the meaning of autonomy. 
This article is based largely on Chinese-language documentary sources, 
including scholarly articles and books on autonomy law; official sources uch 
as government white papers, the NPC Gazette and the NPC website; and a 
comprehensive search of relevant regulatory instruments.14 First, it outlines 
how the legislative powers of autonomous areas and the power to modify 
have been delineated in the reform era. It then describes autonomous 
legislative powers and compares them with the legislative powers of ordinary 
localities. Finally, it looks at how autonomous areas actually use autonomous 
legislative powers, and analyzes some of the fault lines in the contention over 
the meaning of autonomy. 
The power to enact autonomy law 
Enacting autonomy regulations and singular egulations is the most important 
autonomy power of autonomous areas since it serves to regulate and protect the 
exercise of their other autonomy powers.15 
Early in the reform period, then paramount leader Deng Xiaoping 
committed the PRC to "truly implementing" NRA, with the manifestations 
of this being, first, the extent o which members of minority groups hold 
leadership ositions in autonomous areas and, second, "strengthening the 
construction fa legal framework for the NRA system, relying on law to carry 
out the protection of the right of minority nationalities to autonomy."16 
At the 15th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 1997, NRA was 
mentioned as one aspect of the Party's commitment toruling according to 
law.17 According to the NPC Minority Affairs Committee (MAC), autonomy 
legislation "is an important expression of implementing the right to 
autonomy according to law, and a requirement of upholding and perfecting 
the system of nationalities regional autonomy."18 Descriptions of the legislative 
powers of autonomous areas feature prominently in Beijing's efforts odefend 
14 This search was conducted on <www.chinalawinfo.com>, a website run by Beijing University 
which maintains the most comprehensive collection of Chinese laws and regulations. 
15 Ao Junde, "Minzu quyu zizhifa zhong liangzhong biantongquan zhijian de lianxi he qubien 
[The Connection and Difference Between the Two Types of Modification Power in the Law on 
Nationalities Regional Autonomy (LNRA)], Zhongyang minzu daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban), 
vol. 32, no. 1 (2005), p. 21. 16 State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC), Zhongguo gongchandang guanyu minzu wenti dejiben 
guandian he zhengce [ganbu duben] [The Chinese Communist Party's Basic Standpoints and Policies on 
the Nationalities Question (Readings for Cadres)] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2002), p. 160. 
17 SEAC, Zhongguo gongchandang guanyu minzu wenti, p. 163. 18 NPC Minority Affairs Committee (MAC) , "Quanguo renda minzu weiyuanhui guanyu dijiujie 
quanguo renda disanci huiyi zhuxituan jiaofu shenyi de daibiao tichu de yi'an shenyi j eguo de baogao 
" 
[Report from the NPC MAC on the Results of Review of Delegate Motions Passed on by the Presidium 
31 
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itself rom its international critics. For example, the 2005 White Paper on 
Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China gives figures for the 
number of pieces of legislation passed in autonomous areas (but without 
specifying the administrative level of enactment).19 
As part of the revival of socialist legality in the Deng era - autonomy had 
been abolished in all but name during the Cultural Revolution - the 1982 
Constitution contained more extensive provisions on NRA. During its 
drafting, the idea that China should adopt a federal system was raised, as it 
had been when the PRC's first constitution was drafted in 1954, but again 
this was rejected. It was, however, agreed that autonomy should be 
"extensive."20 In a departure from the 1954 scheme, in which only autonomous 
areas were accorded legislative powers, the 1982 Constitution gave local 
governments at provincial level the power to enact local legislation. The 
promulgation of the 1984 Law on Nationalities Regional Autonomy21 
implemented the constitutional provisions on autonomy and expanded on 
them in some key areas. This law was revised in 2001, but the changes were 
relatively minor, and generally failed to respond to concerns about the lack 
of clarity on the nature of autonomous legislative powers.22 
Under the 1982 Constitution, then, autonomous areas have two sets of 
powers. The first set is the powers accorded to local governments in the 
PRC.23 The second is specifically granted to autonomous areas only: to enact 
a local charter and to use autonomy legislation to modify state laws and 
policies.24 The organs of self-government of autonomous areas may exercise 
the latter powers, "within the limits of their authority as prescribed by the 
Constitution, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Nationalities 
Regional Autonomy and other laws" in order to "implement state laws and 
policies in the light of the existing local situation."25 The legislative powers 
of autonomous areas are outlined in Art. 116: 
of the Third Session of the Ninth NPC for Review] , 28 December 2000, Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui 
changwu weiyuanhui gongbao, no. 1 (2001 ), p. 69. Like the other six NPC special committees, the MAC's 
role is to "examine, discuss and draw up relevant bills and draft resolutions," (Constitution, Art. 70[2] ) 
but it has additional powers to "conduct investigations and make proposals on how to strengthen 
unity among the nationalities; [to] deliberate on the regulations on autonomy and singular egulations 
submitted by the autonomous regions to the NPCSC for approval and... report its deliberations to 
the NPCSC" (1982 Organic Law on the NPC, Art. 37[5ii]). 19 State Council. Information Office, "Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China," 
February 2005, Section III.2. Available at: <http://www.china.ore.cn/e-white/20050301/index.htm>. 
20 Cai, Xianfa iingjie, p. 74. 21 Henceforth LNRA. 
For an example of proposals to improve the law, see "Decision on amending the PRC Law on 
Nationalities Regional Autonomy (Draft Proposal)" in Luo Tongda et al., eds., Wanshan minzu quyu 
zizhifa wentiyanjiu [Research on the Issue of Perfecting the Law on Nationalities Regional Autonomy] 
(Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1997). 23 Constitution, Chapter 3, Section V. 24 Constitution, Chapter 3, Section VI. * Art. 115. 
32 
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The people's congresses of national autonomous areas have the power to enact 
regulations on the exercise of autonomy and other singular regulations in the light 
of the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality or 
nationalities in the areas concerned. The regulations on the exercise of autonomy 
and other singular regulations of autonomous regions shall be submitted to the 
Standing Committee of the National People s Congress for approval before they go 
into effect. Those of autonomous prefectures and counties shall be submitted to 
the standing committees of the peoples congresses of provinces or autonomous 
regions for approval before they go into effect, and they shall be reported to the 
Standing Committee of the National People s Congress for the record. 
The main focus of this provision is on approval procedures, with minimal 
guidance on the scope of autonomy legislation. It was not until the passage 
of the 2000 Legislative Law that these parameters were further delineated: 
An autonomy regulation or singular regulation may, in accordance with the 
special characteristics of the local nationalities, make stipulations modifying the 
provisions of a law or administrative regulation, but these must not contravene 
the basic principles of the law or regulation, and modifications may not be made 
of the LNRA, or other laws or administrative regulations that make specific 
provision for the nationality autonomous areas.26 
In addition, the Legislative Law states: "The Constitution is the highest 
legal authority; no law, administrative regulation, local regulation, autonomous 
regulation, singular egulation or administrative or local rule may contravene 
the Constitution."27 It also specifies that the provisions of autonomy regulations 
or singular regulations modifying a higher-level law or regulation will prevail 
in the autonomous area.28 
The LNRA does not provide further guidance on the scope of autonomous 
legislative powers. However, it clearly indicates that the power to modify 
should be used in accord with the developmental priorities of the state: "... 
The organs of self-government of national autonomous areas shall have the 
power to adopt special policies and flexible measures in the light of local 
conditions to speed up the economic and cultural development of these areas."29 
By contrast, local people's congresses (LPCs) of provinces and 
municipalities directly under the central government are authorized to adopt 
local regulations, provided these do not contravene the Constitution, national 
laws, or State Council administrative regulations.30 Once passed, the 
regulations are to be reported to the NPCSC "for the record." Similar powers 
have been granted under specific State Council authorization to the five 
special economic zones (SEZs) and to certain larger cities. Local regulations 
26 Art. 66(2). 
27 Art. 78, emphasis added. 
28 Art. 81. 
29 Art. 6(2) , emphasis added. 
30 Art. 100. 
33 
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of ordinary provinces and cities may be made "in light of the specific 
conditions and actual needs of their respective administrative areas"31 but 
cannot modify national aws. 
The difference b tween ordinary local and autonomous legislative powers 
is disputed. In a 1986 response to a question on what was the difference b tween 
local regulations and autonomy/singular regulations, an explanation from 
the NPC Legislative Affairs Commission (LAC) , which was exercising a power 
of interpretation that is not granted to it by the Constitution, stated that while 
they were clearly different in form, the question of whether autonomy/singular 
regulations were a type of local regulations required "further research." 
Writing much later, Zhou called this response "unconstitutional."32 
Forms and procedures 
Distinct forms are provided for autonomy legislation. The people's 
congresses of autonomous regions, prefectures and counties have four types 
of instrument which they may use in the exercise of their autonomy powers: 
autonomy regulations, singular regulations, modifying rules and 
supplementing rules. 
An autonomy regulation (zizhi tiaoli) is defined by Cai as "a regulation 
passed by the people's congress of a nationality autonomous area that deals 
with basic issues relating to the autonomy of the autonomous area and to 
important matters of general concern there."33 Akind of local charter or 
constitution, according to Ao and Wu, it is considered "a comprehensive 
regulation on autonomy" covering relations between ationalities inthe area 
(but not other social relationships) . To a certain extent, they assert, it may 
even regulate relations between the autonomous area and the higher-level 
state organs.34 
Singular egulations (danxing tiaoli) , on the other hand, while covering 
the same potential ground as autonomy regulations, only deal with one 
specific subject matter in any particular instrument.35 However, a singular 
regulation can be used to modify several laws or regulations at one time, and 
is thus extensive in its scope, as compared to modifying rules.36 
31 Article 64 of the Legislative Law provides for local legislation to cover three types of situations: 
to implement a law or administrative regulation; to cover matters of local concern; and to cover 
matters on which no national laws or regulations yet exist. 32 Response from the NPC LAC to a query on the difference, cited in Zhou Wei, "Minzu quyu zizhi 
fajieshi anli shizheng wenti yanjiu" [Research on the question of actual interpretation of cases under 
the LNRA] Xinan minzu xueyuan xuebao, zhexue shehui kexue ban, vol. 23, no. 7, July 2002, p. 152. 33 Cai, Xianfajingjie, p. 392. 34 Ao Junde and Wu Zongjin, eds., Zhongguo minzu Ufa lilun yu shijian [Theory and Practice of 
China Nationalities Legislation] (Beijing: Zhongguo minzhu yu fazhi chubanshe, 1998), pp. 394-5. 35 Ao and Wu, Zhongguo minzu Ufa, p. 399; Cai, Xianfa jingjie, p. 392. 36 Ao and Wu, Zhongguo minzu Ufa, p. 402. 
34 
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Autonomous area LPCs can also enact modifying rules (biantong guiding) 
and supplementing rules (buchong guiding) . Any rule may apply to only one 
law or policy document.37 They may modify higher-level laws and regulations 
that have explicitly delegated the modification power, including the Criminal 
Law, the Marriage Law, the General Principles of Civil Law, the Civil 
Procedure Law, the Inheritance Law, the Adoption Law, the Forests Law, the 
Prevention of Communicable Diseases Law, and the National Flag Law.38 
Twelve laws enacted between 1979 and 1997 included provisions allowing 
modification.39 
In terms of procedure, the Constitution a d the LNRA grant the power 
to enact autonomy regulations and singular egulations only to the LPCs, 
and not to their Standing Committees (LPCSCs), even though nationally 
and in other localities the latter is the major law-making organ.40 However, 
in about half of the cases where laws delegate the power to modify, the LPCSC 
is authorized to enact modifying rules. Generally, the power to modify "basic 
laws" (such as the Civil Law, the Criminal Law and the Civil Procedure Law) 
can only be exercised by the LPC.41 
Unlike general local legislation, which only needs to be reported to the 
NPCSC "for the record," autonomy regulations, ingular egulations and 
modification rules require approval by a higher-level PC. In the case of the 
ARs, this is the NPCSC; in the case of , the autonomous prefectures and 
counties, this is the PCSC at provincial level.42 According to an authoritative 
interpretation bythe NPC LAC, these organs must consider if the autonomy 
legislation is "appropriate" (shidang) ,43 The autonomous area legislation only 
goes into effect once it has been approved, but the law is silent on what 
should happen if approval is not granted.44 The approval requirement reflects 
the principle that wherever modification is allowed (ke biantong yuanze) , 
approval is necessary, Cai writes.45 Another view is that the approval process 
is required to ensure the uniformity of the legal system.46 
37 Ao and Wu, Zhongguo minzu Ufa, pp. 401-2. 38 This list is from Ao and Wu, Zhongguo minzu lija, p. 402. 39 Zhou Wei, "Minzu zizhi difang danxing tiaoli lifaquan yanjiu [Research on the Legislative 
Power of Autonomous Areas to Enact Singular Regulations], Shehui kexue yanjiu, no. 1 (1998), p. 75. 40 A recommendation that the LNRA be amended to allow for LPCSCs in autonomous areas to 
enact singular egulations was not accepted. "Decision on amending the LNRA," p. 5. 41 Zhou, "Minzu zizhi difang, p. 75. 42 LNRA, Art. 19. Provincial-level PCSCs include those at autonomous-region level and those of 
municipalities directly under the State Council. 43 NPC Legal Affairs Commission (LAC) , "Disizhang: difangxing fagui, zizhi tiaoli, danxing tiaoli, 
guizhang" (Local, Autonomy and Singular Regulations and [Administrative] Rules), Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo lifafa shiyi (Explanation of the Legislative Law of the PRC), p. 11, at <http://www.npc. 
gov.cn/zgrdw/home/lmjndex.jsp?lmid=1137&dm=113723&pdmc=1137>, accessed 24 April 2006. 44 According to the NPC LAC, if the legislation is not approved, it is returned to the dralting 
organ for revision. 45 Cai, Xianfajingjie, pp. 392-3. The 1980 Marriage Law stated that modification rules enacted at 
AR level need only to be reported to the NPCSC "for the record." Following 2001 amendments to the 
law, NPCSC approval for modifications i required. 
46 NPC LAC, Difangxing fagui, p. 1 1 . 
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But conflicts of laws are endemic in the Chinese legal system. Inconsistencies 
between ordinary local laws passed by provincial people's congresses and 
national legislation are common.47 Many localities enact implementing 
regulations that effectively modify national aws and regulations. In practice 
the NPCSC "adopts a policy of passive review" of local legislation; "no review 
unless there is a complaint."48 The NPCSC has never exercised its power to 
repeal local legislation. Even in the case of autonomy legislation, the problem 
is not that he NPCSC has refused to approve it,49 but that it has been blocked 
before that stage. 
Some scholars assert that since it requires NPCSC approval, autonomy 
legislation from ARs should have the same status as State Council enactments 
submitted to the NPCSC for approval and passed by the NPCSC. It thus 
should bind national institutions in a way that local legislation does not. 
"[Autonomy regulations] have the character of local legislation, but they 
also have the character of national legislation," claims Qin.50 As such 
legislation is approved by the NPCSC, Zhou writes, "its legal effect is the 
same as that of laws enacted by the NPCSC."51 
The nature of the modification power 
While some legal scholars present it as the key element of autonomy 
- powers under the NRA system, the modification power has a relatively flimsy 
legal basis. Ao and Wu assert hat he authority of autonomous areas to modify 
is based on provisions of the Constitution and the LNRA, 52 but neither 
instrument actually uses the term in relation to legislation. Chinese scholars 
believe that modification is an inherent aspect of the power to enact 
autonomy legislation.53 The only explicit reference to modification i the 
47 Zou Keyuan, "Harmonizing Local Laws with the Central Legislation," China Perspectives, no. 
52 (March-April 2004), p. 49. 48 Zou, "Harmonizing Local Laws," pp. 51-2. A committee set up by the NPCSC in 2004 to review 
local and administrative regulations for compliance with the Constitution a d the laws does not appear 
to have made any fundamental change to this system. 49 Mackerras seems to assume that the NPCSC has passed autonomy legislation: " [M]y explorations 
among minority officials and leaders suggest that it is actually very unusual for that [veto] to happen. 
Much more likely is that the autonomous places negotiate beforehand with the central authorities 
and make sure that the law is acceptable to the higher level before it is passed at the lower." Chinas 
Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation, p. 39. 50 Qin Naichang, "Lun zhiding zizhi tiaoli de kunnan ji tuijin minzu lifa de xin silu - yi guangxi 
zhuangzu zizhiqu wei li" [Discussion of the difficulties inenacting autonomy regulations and new 
thoughts on promoting minority legislation - examples from the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region], Guangxi minzu xueyuan xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban), no. 3 (1995), p. 6. 51 Zhou, "Minzu zizhi difang," p. 154. 52 Relevant provisions are Constitution Art. 115 and LNRA Art. 6(2). Ao and Wu, Zhongguo minzu 
Ufa, pp. 408-9. 53 In relation to the Constitution: Cai, Xianfa jingjie, pp. 391-2. In relation to the LNRA, Ao, 
"Minzu quyu zizhifa," pp. 19-21. Ao writes that Art. 19 of the LNRA (which replicates Constitution 
Art. 116) "does not clearly indicate modification, but modification isthe intended meaning of the 
stipulation," p. 19. 
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LRNA is the provision for autonomous areas to modify higher-level 
"resolutions, decisions, orders or instructions" ifthese do not "suit the 
conditions" of the area.54 Prior to the enactment of the Legislative Law in 
2000, which incorporated the term "modifying stipulation" (biantong 
guiding) ,55 the only source authorizing modification flaws was the provisions 
of national aws that delegate such power to autonomous areas. 
Some authoritative sources conceive of this power narrowly. The NPC 
LAC has stated that if a national aw does not contain a provision allowing 
for modifying rules, enactment of such rules is not permitted.56 However, a 
number of localities have passed implementing rules making alterations to 
other laws, including of the Election Law, which provides for such rules, and 
the Criminal Procedure Law, which does not.57 The Legislative Law does not 
limit modification tocases of delegated powers. A view that fits better with 
the idea of "extensive" autonomy is that advanced by Yang: modification is 
allowed except when it has been expressly prohibited.58 
Scholars have sought to articulate the scope of modification. Modification 
of laws and regulations may partially limit the application of the relevant 
instrument, ormake additions to it.59 In the case of policy, modification may 
go so far as to halt its application entirely.60 Any modification must comply 
with the "spirit" (jingshen) of the national aws and policies61 and cannot 
contravene the "general principles" (jiben yuanze) of national law.62 However, 
there is no authoritative interpretation on the meaning of these terms. Ao 
and Wu propose the following points to describe the extent of modification 
that has "emerged from law and practice": 
1. Provisions of the Constitution a d the LNRA may not be modified. 
2. Where laws already make provision for minority issues, no further 
modification is allowed. 
3. Where modification is authorized by particular laws, this should not go 
against their "basic principles and spirit." 
4. "There is no need for flexibility, and there should not be any, regarding 
all laws and administrative regulations that are already in accord with the 
'particular political, economic and cultural characteristics of the minority 
in that area' and where there is already no impediment to their 
implementation in that area."63 
54 Art. 20. Approval from the issuing organ of the modified policy is required. 55 Art. 66(2). 
56 Zhou, "Minzu quyu zizhifa," p. 153. 
57 Qin, uLun zhiding zizhi uaoli, pp. 9-10. 
58 Yang, "Minzu zizhi," p. 6. 
59 Ao and Wu, Zhongguo minzu Ufa, pp. 401-2. ™ This is because no limits have been set to this power in law. ao, Minzu quyu ziznna, p. zu. 
61 Cai, Xianfajingjie, p. 391-2. °" Lin, Constitutional L w, p. lot. vsrK^ ljv^, unangxmg iagui, p. i*, suuca uiai uic gcuciai 
principles" and the "spirit" are essentially the same thing. 63 Ao and Wu, Zhongguo minzu Ufa, pp. 410-1 1 . 
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Apart from the last point, these principles were incorporated into the 
Legislative Law in 2000, indicating that in some cases legal academics and 
minority activists have been successful in advancing their vision of autonomy. 
But the NPC LAC's interpretation of that law states that modification may 
be used when the provisions of a law are "not entirely appropriate to the 
actual circumstances" of an autonomous area. National law, it says, is 
addressed to the whole nation, and it is difficult for it to "take care of (zhaogu 
dao) the particular circumstances of autonomous areas, except where 
provisions are specifically made for them, and in that case, the appropriate 
issues have already been addressed by the legislative organ.64 
The exercise of autonomy law-making powers in ARs 
While the legal framework outlined above is fairly comprehensive, the 
fact that key concepts remain in dispute limits its application. It is hardly 
surprising, then, to find that autonomous areas have made little use of their 
autonomy powers to enact legislation. As one observer notes: 
A weak link in our country s legislative system is the fact that, as compared with 
legislative organs in other areas, legislative organs in nationality autonomous 
areas have not been very dynamic in their legislative activities. This is especially 
pronounced in the peoples congresses of some autonomous counties which in some 
cases have only enacted a single autonomy regulation in the course of many 
years.65 
None of the five ARs has enacted an autonomy regulation or a singular 
regulation.66 (When overall figures are given for autonomy legislation, the 
administrative level of enactment is usually unspecified.) In fact, the only 
autonomy legislation passed by ARs has been a small number of modifying 
rules under delegated powers relating to laws that did not require NPCSC 
approval.67 Thus in the reform era, the ARs have not exercised their powers to 
make autonomy laws in any significant way. According to Qin, a minority scholar 
from Guangxi, this state of affairs "is not beneficial to the exercise of 
autonomy powers by the autonomous areas, and affects the development of 
the economy and culture of nationality autonomous areas."68 
64 NPC LAC, Difangxing fagui, p. 1 1-12. b5 Zhang Xiaohui, Zhongguo falii zai shaoshu minzu diqu de shishi [Implementation of Chinese Law 
in Ethnic Minority Areas] (Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 1994), quoted in Zhou, "Minzu zizhi difang," 
p. 76. 66 NPC LAC, Difangxing fagui, p. 1, states that as of 1998, none had enacted an autonomy 
regulation. None have been passed since then. NPC MAC, "baogao," 28 December 2000, p. 69, confirms 
that as of that date, no AR had passed any singular egulation. 
67 Mostly on the Marriage Law (generally providing for lower age of marriage), with some on 
the Adoption I.aw. m Qin, uLun zhiding zizhi tiaoli," p. 2. 
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Qin's account of the effort o pass autonomy regulations in Guangxi 
provides unique insight into this process. Drafting of these regulations started 
soon after the founding of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (GZAR) 
in 1958, and by 1995, the document had gone through 19 drafts. There had 
been initial drafts in the 1950s, but the work began in earnest after the 1984 
passage of the LNRA. Following extensive consultations within the GZAR, 
in March 1987 the 13th draft was submitted to the CCP Central Committee. 
The CCP Secretariat sent on the draft o the NPC MAC69 and the State 
Council. Two opinions emerged: first, the draft did not sufficiendy reflect 
the particular character of Guangxi; and second, "there was a rather large 
distance between the opinions of the relevant State Council ministries and 
commissions and the requirements of Guangxi, reflecting the fact hat their 
perceptions of the spirit of the LNRA were not in accord." Finally, under the 
guidance of the NPC MAC, the 18th draft was completed by March 1989, and 
after further revisions by the MAC, was submitted to the State Council for 
consultation.70 
In 1991 the State Council Legal Affairs Bureau solicited opinions on the 
draft GZAR Autonomy Regulations from its ministries and commissions. 
"Very few" had no fundamental objections. Qin summarizes their reactions 
as follows. Some more or less completely rejected aspects of the draft hat 
allowed the GZAR to carry out special policies, stressing that policies must 
"accord with unified national regulations." Some objected that provisions 
of the draft were not in accord with their departmental regulations,71 thus 
implying that the autonomy regulations should have lower status than such 
regulations. Almost all responses referred to the draft regulations as "local 
regulations."72 
The other four ARs were apparently waiting to see the outcome of the 
Guangxi efforts to pass an autonomy regulation before trying to get the 
centre to approve theirs.73 In Inner Mongolia, the dominance of Han Chinese 
in the regional PC thwarted the efforts of two successive Mongol chairmen 
of the body to pass autonomy regulations in the 1980s, writes Bulag.74 Drafting 
of the autonomy regulations for the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) began 
in 1980 under the leadership of the TAR Party Committee, according to Ao 
and Wu. The draft underwent several rounds of discussion by its Standing 
Committee and the TAR PCSC, and also "won the support" of the NPC MAC 
69 See note 18. 
70 Qin, "Lun zhiding zizhi tiaoli," pp. 2-3. Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, pp. 1 1 7-18, also gives a brief 
account of the effort o pass the regulations. 71 Guizhang, for example, normative documents that do not nave tne status ot law. 72 Qin, "Lun zhiding zizhi tiaoli," pp. 7-8. 73 Personal communication. 
74 Uradyn E. Bulag, "Inner Mongolia: The Dialectics of Colonization and' Ethnicity Building, 
in Morris Rossabi, ed., Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers (Seattle and London: University of 
Washington Press, 2004), pp. 94-5. 
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and "relevant central organs." There were a number of exercises soliciting 
opinions on the draft at consultation meetings and the document went 
through 15 drafts altogether, but apparently was never submitted to the State 
Council.75 Its contents included: 
1. A preamble mphasizing national unity and asserting that the TAR was 
an indivisible part of China. 
2. Provisions that mainly Tibetans should constitute the personnel of 
autonomous organs, but with appropriate representation of other 
minorities, and emphasizing the interdependence of the minorities and 
the Han. 
3. Provisions on self-government i cluding: 
• exercise of self-government in setting development plans; 
• a list of the special policies and flexible arrangements granted by the 
centre to the AR; 
• reflection of contemporary changes, for example the socialist market 
economy; and 
• a chapter on religion reflecting its importance for Tibet.76 
Although it does not have a constitutional role in the exercise of 
autonomous legislative powers, the State Council has the power "to direct 
and administer affairs concerning the nationalities and to safeguard the 
equal rights of minority nationalities and the right of autonomy of the 
national autonomous areas."77 In effect, writes Qin, the NPCSC has ceded 
its approval power to "certain functional departments at the centre, in 
particular the economic management ministries" because this is the way that 
the division of interests between local areas and the centre are generally 
dealt with.78 Government departments at the national and provincial level 
are reluctant to devolve powers that directly affect heir economic interests 
to autonomous areas, assert Zhu and Yu.79 
Yet the State Council is not the only barrier to AR autonomy legislation. 
In practice the CCP dominates the process of drafting autonomy legislation, 
as hinted at above. According to Qin, once drafting of any autonomy 
regulation is completed at AR level, the local Party Committee has to submit 
it to the CCP Central Committee for review, and the Party centre consults 
various parties on the draft. Only when consensus has been reached will the 
75 Ao and Wu, Zhongguo minzu Ufa, p. 455. 76 Ao and Wu, Zhongguo minzu Ufa, pp. 455-6. 77 Constitution, Art. 89(11). 
78 Qin, "Lun zhiding zizhi tiaoli," p. 8. 79 The absence of autonomy regulations at AR level is attributed to this in Zhu Guobin and Yu 
Lingyun, "Regional Minority Autonomy in the PRC: A Preliminary Appraisal from a Historical 
Perspective," International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, vol. 7 (2000), pp. 54-5. 
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autonomy regulation be submitted to the AR PC for enactment.80 
Apparently the revision of the LNRA in 2001 has not resulted in any 
change in the deadlocked situation regarding autonomy legislation in the 
ARs, since no such laws have been enacted since that time. Furthermore, 
the revision did not address ome of the barriers to such legislation identified 
by legal scholars and minority activists. Proposals that the LNRA be retitled 
a "basic law" to indicate its status in the hierarchy of laws and that a sentence 
be added to the Preamble stating that "all laws, administrative regulations, 
local regulations and rules may not conflict with the Constitution a d this 
law" were not adopted.81 
Although they have not passed significant laws using their autonomy 
powers, the ARs have used their powers to enact general local legislation that 
does not require such approval. In some cases, this may cover matters bearing 
on autonomy, such as language.82 An interesting question (but one that is 
beyond the scope of this article) is to what extent hese regulations exceed 
the provisions of national regulations.83 
The subprovincial level 
In contrast to the situation at AR level, many sub-provincial autonomous 
areas have enacted autonomy regulations and singular egulations. By 2003, 
according to the State Council, a total of 133 autonomy regulations and 384 
singular egulations had been enacted.84 Given the absence of any such 
regulations originating from the ARs, it is evident hat all of these were passed 
by prefectural and county-level entities. Another source states that by the 
year 2000, 135 of the country's 154 autonomous areas had passed autonomy 
regulations, while 238 singular egulations had been enacted.85 According 
to a survey published in 1998, 84 percent of autonomous areas had enacted 
autonomy regulations and 5 percent were in the process of doing so. Most 
of the singular regulations appear to be enacted by a few autonomous 
prefectures and counties with active PCs.86 
80 Qin, ttLun zhiding zizhi tiaoli," p. 6. 81 The proposed new title for the LNRA was minzu quyu zizhi jibenfa. bee Decision on amending 
the LNRA," p. 3. This high-level proposal was supported at central evel and provincial level. 82 Examples are the Tibet Autonomous Region Regulations on the Study, Use, and Development 
of the Tibetan Language (1987, amended in 2002) and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 
Regulations on Language and Writing (1993, amended in 2002). 83 When an unnamed autonomous region submitted a piece of legislation to the NFCSC tor 
approval, it was sent back with the advice that the regulation should be passed as ordinary local 
legislation, according to Cai Dingjian, "Mechanisms for resolving conflicts of law in China" [Zhongguo 
falu chongtu de jiejue jizhi], paper presented at conference, Legal Perspectives of Constitutional 
Review, University of Hong Kong, April 2004, p. 2. 
84 State Council, Regional Autonomy, 2005, Section III.2. 
85 NPC MAC, "baogao," 28 December 2000, p. 69. 86 The survey found that 16 percent of autonomous areas had passed rather a lot ot singular 
regulations, while 64 percent had passed "rather few," and 20 percent none at all. "Appendix 1: Analysis 
of survey questionnaires on implementation of the LNRA and its amendment" [Fulu: yi, minzu quyu 
zizhifa shixing yu xiugai wenjuan fenxi], in Luo, Wanshan minzu quyu zizhifa, pp. 272-3. 
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The number of autonomy regulations means it is difficult togeneralize 
about their content. According to Chao, writing in 1994, they "are usually 
copies" of the LNRA.87 This is certainly likely for autonomous counties, 
considering the fact that a 1992 NPC LAC explanation asserted that 
"autonomy regulations of autonomous counties hould not make rules" that 
go beyond the provisions of the Constitution a d the LNRA.88 The willingness 
of provincial-level PCSCs to pass them may be an indication that most 
autonomy regulations are relatively uncontroversial. 
The current set of 25 prefectural autonomy regulations - all autonomous 
prefectures (APs) have enacted them, except the five in Xinjiang - were all 
passed between 1985 and 1990, although a number have subsequently been 
revised.89 They are generally a collection of provisions from the LNRA 
combined with the relevant national policies, such as on the prohibition of 
drugs and human trafficking on the Burma-China border.90 They also reflect 
the government and Party line of the time period when they were passed. 
Some AP-level autonomy regulations do reflect a certain degree of 
autonomy. Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture provides an example of 
what may be achieved - at least on paper - if an autonomous area uses its 
legislative power to protect its interests. Strategically located on the border 
with North Korea, Yanbian was the first autonomous area in the PRC to enact 
autonomy regulations, in 1985, following the passage of the LNRA.91 These 
thus provided a model for other autonomy regulations. The regulations were 
extensively revised in 2003. 
While they incorporate many features of the LNRA and central policy on 
autonomous areas,92 the Yanbian Autonomy Regulations go beyond the 
provisions of national aws and policies. For example, they have entrenched 
status in the local legal order, in that their enactment and amendment may 
only be effected with a two-thirds majority vote of the Yanbian Prefectural 
People's Congress (PPC).93 Also, the regulations reserve a greater number 
of government posts for Koreans, requiring that he Chairman of the Yanbian 
PPCSC must be Korean,94 that more than half of the leading officials in the 
87 Chien-min Chao, "The Procedure for Local Legislation," p. 114. 88 Zhou, "Minzu quyu zizhi fa," pp. 150-1. w This list is based on the local regulations database in the Peking University legal website, 
available at <www.chinalawinfo.com>. 
90 A sample of such regulations was reviewed for this paper, including those from Linxia Hui 
Autonomous Prefecture (AP), Honghe Hani Yi AP, Yanbian Korean AP, Dali Bai AP, Xishuangbanna 
Tai AP, West Qinghai Mongolian Tibetan AP, Gannan Tibetan AP and Wenshan Zhuang Miao AP. 
Yanbian chaoxianzu zizhizhou zizhi tiaoli [Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture Autonomy 
Regulations], passed by the third session of the Eighth Yanbian Korean APPC on 24 April 1985. ^ Its main subject matters are the organization of the prefectural PC, PCSC and the people s 
government; management of the economy and finances; and language, education, science and 
technology, and culture. 98 Art. 12 in 1985 text, Art. 11 in 2003 revised version. Such a procedure appears to be the 
invention of the Yanbian PPC. 
M Art. 13 in 1985 text, Art. 12 in 2003 revised version. 
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government "may" be Koreans,95 and that the head or deputy head of the 
Prefectural Intermediate People's Court (the highest court in the area) and 
the Prefectural Procuratorate "should" be Koreans.96 
As for singular egulations enacted at prefectural and county level, the 
available lists of such regulations97 appear to indicate that hese are essentially 
analogous to general local legislation.98 Since units at this level of the 
administrative hierarchy do not have the power to enact such legislation, 
autonomy powers are the only ones available to them. Some are labelled 
"implementation measures" (shishi banfa) or merely "measures" (banfa), 
commonly a designation for regulatory instrument that implements a higher- 
level regulation. Singular egulations passed at this level cover a range of 
topics, including the use of languages, compulsory education, ethnic 
education, management of natural resources, population control, regulation 
of specific local entities (such as environmental protection areas, historic 
cities, tourism sites) ,economic management, management of land, urban 
planning, public order, and "rights and interests."99 Interestingly, religion is 
apparently not a major subject of singular egulations. 
One might expect that where modification power is explicitly delegated, 
autonomous areas would have been more proactive in exercising legislative 
power. However, this has apparently not been the case. Of the nine laws that 
had authorized modifying rules by 1998, such rules had only been enacted 
in relation to three: the Marriage Law, the Inheritance Law, and the Election 
Law. As mentioned above, to date ARs have only passed modifying rules 
relating to the Marriage Law and the Adoption Law. By 2003, a total of 68 
modifying and supplementing rules had been enacted by autonomous 
areas.100 
Conclusion: What hope for "extensive" autonomy? 
Lin argues that "tighter controls are imposed on the legislative authority 
of the five ethnic minority regions than on provinces and municipalities 
95 Art. 1 6. The Constitution and the LNRA require that the head of government be a member 
of the minority exercising autonomy. Autonomy regulations from other APs specify that the number 
of leadership osts filled by minorities may be greater than their proportion in the population. 96 Art. 25. The Dali Bai AP Autonomy Regulations (1986, amended in 2005) specify in Art. 22 
that a member of the Bai group should fill the post of either the head or deputy head of the Prefectural 
Intermediate People's Court and the Prefectural Procuratorate. 97 See for example the list provided in Ao and Wu, Zhongguo minzu Ufa, pp. 689-704, and the lists 
for Tibetan areas in Sorensen and Philips, Legal Standards and Autonomy Options, Appendix A, pp. 
79-100. 
98 An assessment of the content of this legislation is beyond the scope of this article. 99 This enumeration is based on the list of topics provided in Ao and Wu, Zhongguo minzu Ufa, 
pp. 400-1 . All those in the last category are from Yanbian, and cover protection of minors, "management" 
of "peasant [tax] burdens," and establishment of trade unions in foreign-invested enterprises. 100 State Council, Regional Autonomy, 2005, Section III.2. 
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directly under the [Central People's Government]. In other words, the five 
autonomous regions enjoy less legislative autonomy than ordinary 
provinces."101 This is certainly true as regards autonomous legislative powers, 
and goes against the principles outlined in the Constitution, which clearly 
indicate that the autonomous areas are supposed to enjoy more power than 
other areas.102 
The work of minority scholars and legal academics who write on autonomy 
law, as well as the NPC MAC, use the terrain of law to advance a vision of 
"extensive" autonomy that harks back to the promises made to minority 
groups in the early years of the PRC. Essentially, these involved a certain 
degree of accommodation with pre-existing political structures, reaching its 
largest extent in the Sino-Tibetan "17-Point Agreement" of May 1951. 10S 
Some activist minority cadres seek to spur their co-ethnics to defend this 
version of autonomy by attributing the failure to exercise autonomy powers 
to a lack of awareness among local officials of the rights these confer.104 
Another view is that, as Yang puts it, "the most important reason why 
autonomous areas have not been able properly to exercise their legislative 
powers is that some theoretical questions have not been resolved."105 The 
NPC MAC implicitly acknowledges opposition to the exercise of autonomy 
powers. In 2000, it supported a delegate motion calling for assistance to be 
provided to ARs to enact autonomy regulations. While the efforts of the ARs 
themselves would be important, the MAC stated, " [T] he relevant state organs 
should also provide the necessary assistance."106 
Proponents of extensive autonomy use a tactic familiar from the field of 
constitutional law in China: what is termed by Anagnost "prolepsis" representing 
something as if it already exists.107 Thus although the dominant forces in the 
Chinese government resist efforts to clarify the meaning of key terms in 
autonomy law - evident in the minimal revisions to the LNRA after years of 
proposals and discussion - these scholars and activists articulate meanings 
of the modification power and the status of autonomy legislation that express 
a vision of autonomy under a future constitutionally governed state. 
By contrast, institutions such as the NPC LAC and certain State Council 
ministries seem to view autonomy as outdated and essentially unnecessary 
and, in the form proposed by activist scholars, a challenge to their power. 
In their view, the principal task of "nationality work" is economic development 
101 Lin, Constitutional Law, p. 157. 102 Zhou, "Minzu zizhi difang," pp. 77-8. 1U3 I his agreement was nullified after the 1959 Uprising and denounced by the Dalai Lama after 
he fled into exile. 
104 Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, pp. 1 18-120. 105 Yang, "Minzu zizhi," p. 1. 106 NPC MAC, "baogao," 28 December 2000, p. 69. 
Ann Anagnost, National past-times: narrative, representation, and power in modern China (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 8. 
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of "backward" minority areas in accordance with the Han "advanced" model 
established by the Chinese state.108 Thus the NPC LAC states that the need 
for autonomy legislation depends on whether the centre has "taken care" 
of the interests of the minority regions. The corollary of this is that the 
modification power is no longer needed, except where it may be used to 
advance the "modernization" ofautonomous areas, as is emphasized in the 
LNRA's requirement that special policies and flexible measures only be used 
to support state priorities.109 
From this perspective, autonomy is history: it is a policy that served its 
purpose of incorporating peripheral areas into the new state and now has 
little meaning. A few researchers in key think-tanks argue that "collective 
rule" (gongzhi, between the state and autonomous areas, and between 
different e hnic groups, including the Han, within the latter) is now a better 
model for ethnic policies than autonomy.110 Similarly, advocates of a return 
to China's pre-modern policies of "culturalization" of barbarian" minorities 
argue that "politicizing" ethnicity through measures such as autonomy serves 
only to inflame thnic tensions.111 
Debate over a key factor influencing autonomy legislation - the CCP - is 
generally absent in the sources used for this article. The Party has a key role 
in determining the general direction of legislation, and all laws are supposed 
to reflect CCP policies.112 As has often been pointed out in the literature, 
Party dominance places inherent limits on the provisions for autonomy, 
since, for example, there is no requirement that local CCP leaders in 
autonomous areas be members of minority groups, and indeed the opposite 
is often the case.113 
But CCP obstruction may not be the pri comparisons with decentralization 
in other developing countries.114 Legislative powers, in particular, may be 
108 According to former top leader Jiang Zemin: "There are two main tasks in nationality work 
in New China: the first is to guide the people of all nationalities to stand up and liberate themselves 
and choose the socialist road through the implementation of reforms of society; the second is to 
promote the common prosperity of all nationalities through carrying out the construction of socialism, 
speeding up the economic and social development of all nationalities, particularly the minority 
nationalities and the minority areas." SEAC, Zhongguo gongchandang guanyu minzu wenti, p. 12. 109 Art. 6(2). 
110 See scholars quoted in Gardner Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: tian nationalist imperatives 
and Uyghur Discontent, East-West Center Policy Studies 11, 2004, pp. 45-6; and in Bulag, "Inner 
Mongolia," p. 95. 111 Rong Ma, "A New Perspective in Guiding Ethnic Relations in the Twenty-first Century: 'De- 
politicization' of Ethnicity in China," Asian Ethnicity, vol. 8, no. 3, October 2007. 112 For a detailed enumeration of the multitude of ways m which the CCP involves itself in the 
legislative process, see Qin Qianhong and Li Yuan, "The Influence of the CCP on Legislating" 
[Zhongguo gongchandang dui lifa de yingxiang], paper on file with the authors. 113 See Mackerras, China's Ethnic Minorities and Globalization, pp. 41-43, Harrell, Ways oj Being 
Ethnic, p. 77. 1 " See, tor example, Y.r. L»nai ana /\.j . Kegan, l ne imw, rouncs ana naminisiTaium uj ueurruTuinuiiun 
in Papua New Guinea (Boroko, Papua New Guinea: National Research Institute), pp. 192-4 and p. 400. 
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underused.115 u[T]he experience of China confirms an observation common 
to most studies of decentralization i developing countries: while certain 
legal powers and administrative tasks have been shifted to lower levels, the 
corresponding transfer of resources and decision-making power is mostly 
lacking. The legal transfer of law-making powers to local populations is often 
half-hearted, incomplete or even deceptive," write Li and Otto.116 
In the case of China, the comparative lessons hould not be overstated. 
The efforts of ARs to exercise their legislative powers have been thwarted. 
Some of the elements considered basic for autonomy systems elsewhere are 
absent in the PRC system. Also, the contrast with the legislative output of 
ordinary local areas is instructive: there has been hardly any effort to ensure 
that their legislation stays within the limits et out for it, and a huge volume 
of regulations has been passed. 
The views advanced by minority activists and legal scholars indicate that 
the current legal framework may not be inherently incompatible with 
"genuine autonomy" in some form. The promise of an "extensive" autonomy 
making use of a modification power defined by its historical roots to allow 
for different "systems" could potentially provide some space for real self- 
government, given the necessary political will. Yet because of the lack of legal 
clarity on autonomy powers, divisions of opinion and interest within the 
Chinese state would likely continue to make the realization of that vision 
difficult, even if such a change of heart did occur. 
University ofHong Kong, Hong Kong and 
University ofBritish Columbia, Canada, September 2008 
115 See, for example, Richard Simeon and Christina Murray, "Multi-Sphere Governance in South 
Africa: An Interim Assessment," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 31, no. 4 (2001), pp. 77-80. The 
South African example highlights the barriers created for provincial autonomy by the dominance of 
a strong, centralized party. - 116 Yuwen Li and Jan-Michel Otto, "Central and Local Law-Making: Studying China's Experience," 
in Eduard B. Vermeer and Ingrid d'Hooghe, eds., China's Ugal Reforms and Their Political Limits 
(Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon, 2002), p. 2. 
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